Jerusalem might be considered an enclave city par excellence: Israeli settlements in the Palestinian east of the city enjoy higher levels of services and are connected through infrastructures that immobilise those in Palestinian neighbourhoods. At the same time, Palestinian neighbourhoods have become exclaves of the city since the construction of the Separation Barrier. Beyond the topdown view of ethnically-based residential segregation, however, attention to quotidian movements reveals the practices through which the borders of enclaves are undermined and reinforced.
Introduction
In Jerusalem, where most neighbourhoods are divided along ethno-national lines, Palestinian neighbourhoods are underserved by the municipality, while Israeli settlements in their midst enjoy a much higher level of amenities. Segregated infrastructures fragment urban space and entrench socio-spatial divisions. From this perspective, the city appears to fit neatly into prevalent understandings of processes of exclusion in enclave cities, according to which dominant groups construct gated enclaves to shield themselves from the marginalised. This paper argues, however, that if urban segregation is examined through the lens of people's movements rather than merely static residential patterns, new perspectives open up which permit the agency of marginalised residents to become visible and allow us to understand how enclaves are both undermined and reinforced through quotidian practices.
In this article I seek to answer the following questions in the context of Palestinian everyday mobility in Jerusalem: How does movement across segregated urban space affect the borders of enclaves, in the short and long term? When and how are enclave borders reinforced? And how does paying attention to mobility alter the picture presented by an analysis solely based on residential segregation? Jerusalem presents an excellent case study for examining these issues, as it constitutes an extreme example of urban segregation due to its clearly defined residential enclaves reinforced by a history of ethnic division and ongoing institutionalised exclusion. The Jerusalem light rail (JLR), which began operating in 2011, serves as a particularly salient case study as it is the first mode of public transportation to connect Israeli settlements and Palestinian neighbourhoods, thus de-segregating public transport in some areas. I focus here on the enclaves of Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem and its immediate hinterland, forgoing a discussion of enclaves within the west of the city (cf. Hasson, 2001) .
A short description of the methods and theoretical approach used is followed by a review of the literature and an outline of the local manifestations of 'enclave urbanism'. The argument of the empirical section consists of two main parts. In the first, I show how Palestinians cross Israeliimposed boundaries to maintain severed urban linkages, how embodied practices can contribute to a sense of freedom of movement despite these restrictions, and how Palestinians move through (and into) Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem to gain access to resources denied to Palestinian neighbourhoods. In the second section, I argue that Palestinians make use of the relative autonomy afforded by exclusionary exclaves created by the Separation Barrier. Finally, I show how borders are reinforced by both voluntary and enforced limitation of movement across enclaves in times of heightened tension. I conclude that enclaves are not static, but are consistently undermined and re-made through quotidian practices. The mobility-based perspective thus adds valuable nuances to the understanding of Jerusalem as an enclave city, and may help us rethink internal divisions in less conflict-prone cities as well.
Methodological and theoretical approach
This article relies primarily on data collected in 146 semi-structured interviews and follow-up conversations, the majority of which were conducted between July and September 2013, and between June and September 2014 and 2015 --periods during which the prevailing levels of tension in Jerusalem fluctuated strongly. Of the Palestinian respondents, residents of and commuters to East
Jerusalem were the primary target group (31% of the total, 56% of them female); in interviewing them, I frequently employed a 'go-along' approach (Kusenbach, 2003) . Other respondents included transport company managers and employees, including drivers (15%), NGO representatives and researchers (13%), community leaders and local officials (5%) as well as national government officials and planners (3% While the role of infrastructures in enforcing the division of Jerusalem has been explored taking the top-down view of planning, the politics of Palestinian mobility within East Jerusalem have not been sufficiently examined from a bottom-up perspective. This approach may permit us to nuance the picture of urban enclave life. Accordingly, the 'people-based' approach (Kwan, 2009 ) taken here, insists on the political importance of the everyday in shaping urban space through routine activities, including tactics that subtly resist power by seizing opportunities (de Certeau, 1984) . Rather than only through policy, cities are also shaped by the activities of their residents, even the most marginalised. Such reshaping, achieved through incremental changes to the usage of spaces, has been called the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' (Bayat, 2009) . The need for attention to mobility across borders is grounded in the understanding that space is not static or frozen in time, but is made up of a multiplicity of trajectories (Massey, 2005) , which are in themselves worth exploring. As much as by static enclaves, the lives and identities of city dwellers are shaped by circulations which enable encounters between different groups (Jensen, 2009) . Following from Simmel's notion that a border 'is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that forms itself spatially ' (1997: 143) , I conceptualise intra-urban borders not as a
given, but as products of ongoing processes of reinforcement and subversion through everyday actions which co-constitute the physical reality of the border. In a contested space such as Jerusalem, both top-down interventions and everyday acts are often based on the attempt to create or maintain ethnically homogenous enclaves, what Sibley (1995) terms the 'purification of space'.
As conflict in Jerusalem (as well as its potential resolution) is often conceived of from a bird's-eye view (Geneva Accord, 2009: 111) , understanding socio-spatial dynamics through everyday interactions at street level is important for gaining an understanding of the lived city.
Urban enclaves and the mobility gap underpinning them
While ethnically-based segregation is by no means a new phenomenon in cities (Nightingale, 2012) , the urban studies literature in recent decades has paid particular attention to class-based segregation in line with the worldwide neoliberal turn (Castells, 1996; Davis, 2007) . As privatised service provision has replaced the integrated 'modern infrastructural ideal' of public urban amenities, homogenous and securitised quarters emerged at the expense of shared public spaces (Graham and Marvin, 2001) . Enclaves are often subject to special governance regimes and access restrictionstheir etymological root in the Latin word clavis ('key') points to the fact that their closed-off perimeter is a defining aspect. Thus, the emergence of affluent gated communities alongside marginal areas is understood to have created new forms of inclusion and exclusion in the postindustrial city (Douglass et al., 2012) . Enclave urbanism is not merely an expression of inequality, but also reproduces it -for instance, when securitised gated communities cause a decrease in security for those living outside the enclaves (Kaker, 2014) . The overarching narrative of this new form of 'enclave urbanism' is thus often 'alarmist' in that it links enclaves to the decline of both the public realm and the socially diverse yet coherent city (Wissink, 2013) .
Despite the recent 'mobilities turn' (Urry, 2007; Sheller, 2004) , the literature on urban segregation and enclaves has not paid sufficient attention to activities and mobilities, focusing its analysis mainly on residential patterns (Kwan, 2009 (Kwan, , 2013 . The role of mobility is mainly understood in the context of unequal access to infrastructures, which creates 'premium networked spaces' at the expense of those living in 'spaces of immobility and fear' outside the elite enclaves (Graham and Marvin, 2001 ). This analysis is in line with the wider mobilities literature, which has highlighted the importance of immobilisations (Adey, 2006) : while the movement of 'kinetic elites' is facilitated (Cresswell, 2010) , the mobility of less desirable subjects is curtailed (Shamir, 2005) , resulting in a 'mobility gap' (Turner, 2007) . Research on mobilities has examined the subversive and transgressive potential of embodied leisure practices in the city, such as walking (Pinder, 2011) , cycling (Spinney, 2010) , and parkour (Saville, 2008; Mould, 2009 ), but has primarily done so in localities where conflicts over urban spaces do not have repercussions as severe as in a contested city such as Jerusalem.
According to Caldeira (1996) , the spatial segregation produced by fortified urban enclaves limits everyday interactions with other groups and thereby magnifies perceptions of social difference; the interactions that do take place as borders are crossed are marked by 'suspicion and danger'. The picture painted, then, is one of spatial isolation and inequality, both in terms of residential service provision -what has been termed 'infrastructural violence' (Rodgers and O'Neill, 2012) -and in the means of mobility. Physical proximity in the city is no longer seen as a key determinant of social interaction (Coutard, 2008) and since cross-enclave or chance encounters are limited, inequalities are exacerbated and the potential (physical and political) space for forging solidarities is undermined (Young, 2000; Sennett, 2007) . An examination of the literature on enclaves and mobility in the Jerusalem context would, at first glance, seem to support these notions, even to an extreme degree.
Enclave urbanism in East Jerusalem from the top down
In Jerusalem, which is routinely referred to as 'divided' (Klein, 2005) , 'segregated' (Thawaba and Al-Rimmawi, 2013) , 'fragmented' (Pullan, 2011) , or even 'many bordered' (Dumper, 2014) , enclaves have a long history. While communal borders in Jerusalem were defined by Mahallat neighbourhood units during Ottoman times (Tamari, 2009) , the clear segmentation of the old city into four confessional quarters was only implemented during the British Mandate, when Jerusalem was rebuilt as a 'divided city' on the basis of the principle of the 'unmixing of peoples' (Roberts, 2013) . However, despite the Mandate authorities' insistence on ethnic segregation, there were significant zones of mixing, in particular in commercial areas (Abowd, 2014 (Dumper, 1997) . Both forms are not merely isolated enclaves, but also perform a frontier-expanding function. The major settlements in East Jerusalem today are closely linked to the west of the city, annexing large swathes of Palestinian land and conceptually shifting the Green Line far into East Jerusalem and even past the municipal boundary (Shlay and Rosen, 2010; Allegra, 2013) . Due to this strategic purpose, such localities have been described as part of a 'civilian occupation' (Segal and Weizman, 2003) . Owing to their military origins, the settlement enclaves are built as 'defensible spaces' (Newman, 1972) in that they are clearly demarcated, internally cohesive, and ensure easy surveillance of anyone entering . Their homogeneity and exclusivity is ensured by ethnically-based landownership laws and property markets (Yacobi, 2012a) . Access to the larger settlement neighbourhoods in Jerusalem is not restricted by a highly security perimeter, but through 'carefully selected' connections and disconnections of the mobility infrastructures (Pullan, 2013a) . It is often impossible to walk from a Palestinian area to a neighbouring settlement without being forced by the lack of pedestrian pavements to walk on the road or across open space, or even to cross major highways. Because cross-enclave movement is thus restricted but not impossible, we can think of the perimeters of these enclaves as 'borders' in the sense of Sennett (2011): they are semipermeable membranes rather than boundaries or hard edges that undermine activity on either side. infrastructures' (Pullan, 2013b) turn Palestinian space into an archipelago of disconnected islands (Handel, 2013) . The spatial inequality brought about by the mobility gap is exacerbated by the lack of investment in Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem. Due to decades of neglect, even middle-class Palestinian neighbourhoods lack basic amenities, including functional roads and pavements, connection to the sewage system, reliable garbage removal, community facilities, public parks and postal service (Cheshin et al., 1999; UN OCHA, 2009) . Such policies based on unequal citizenship, effective ethnic segregation and resource allocation on the basis of ethnicity have been termed 'urban ethnocracy' (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002) .
Over the last decade, the Israeli Separation Barrier, a more overt means of interrupting movement, has cut off at least 55,000 Jerusalem residents -a quarter of the city's Palestinian population -from the centre of the city and the economic, educational, medical and social resources located there. While it was built ostensibly as a security measure to ward off Palestinian suicide attacks in the centre of the city, the Barrier has increased insecurity for Palestinians, who also fear their permanent exclusion from the rest of the city as municipal officials have abrogated their responsibility for these areas (Hasson, 2010) .
From this top-down view, it appears that Jerusalem fits neatly into the enclave urbanism paradigm, where the establishment of 'spaces of mobility and flow for some' is predicated on the 'construction of barriers for others' (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 11) . Urban inequality is entrenched by enclavisation, with the securitisation of some urban areas causing the insecurity of others, service provision severely lacking in marginalised neighbourhoods, and a variety of legal regimes and access restrictions being applied to the enclaves and exclaves. As segregated mobility infrastructures in East Jerusalem appear to only further sever Israeli and Palestinian areas from one another, in this situation of 'frontier urbanism' (Pullan, 2011) , it has been argued, residents of enclaves have a merely 'spectatorial relationship', lacking the direct personal interaction that might alleviate the conflict (Hercbergs and Noy, 2015) .
Palestinian everyday mobilities and the transgression of borders
The restriction of Palestinian mobility by means of barriers, checkpoints, roadblocks and a complex permit system is one of the Israeli occupation's main methods of spatio-social control (Weizman, 2007; Ophir et al., 2009 ). This mobility regime negatively impacts Palestinian everyday life by stifling movement (Hammami, 2004 (Hammami, , 2010 Kelly, 2006; Handel, 2009; Harker, 2009 ), yet many Palestinians nonetheless insist on moving between their disconnected enclaves and into Israeli spaces. Beyond transgressing geographical borders, I argue, everyday mobility can also be transgressive in its assertion of presence in shared urban spaces.
'Maintaining the connection' in spite of the Separation Wall
Palestinians who refuse to accept the restriction of their mobility regularly cross the checkpoints separating them from the urban core, despite the fact that these journeys entail heavy traffic, long periods of waiting, humiliating treatment by soldiers and a higher risk of encountering clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army (Braverman, 2011; Kotef and Amir, 2011; Tawil-Souri, 2011; Amir, 2013 Both those respondents who crossed 'illegally' and those with Israeli permission employed various tactics to minimise the strain of the journey and thus make the crossing less disruptive to their lives.
In circumventing checkpoints, or knowing which routes to use at which time, they display an intimate knowledge of the surveillance and control regime (Zureik et al., 2010) . In addition, many commuters made use of social media to obtain updates on the traffic and security situation at checkpoints surrounding Jerusalem. Evading militarised mobility regimes by circumventing constraints and making use of the available resources might then be considered part of the Palestinian 'art of presence' (Bayat, 2009) . While most saw walking as the least preferable way of crossing urban borders, as it leaves the walker exposed, pedestrian movement also allows Palestinians to evade Israeli controls, for instance by using small alleyways and back routes on foot (Ahmad, Beit Hanina), thus opening up possibilities of movement beyond the predetermined routes set by state power (Handel, 2009 ).
Despite insisting on their irrevocable right to access the city, most respondents cut off from Jerusalem in fact only entered the city without a permit when it was urgently necessary -for a visa appointment at a consulate or to visit a friend or family member in hospital. According to Dina, a Bethlehem resident, 'It's not worth the risk just to go for fun.' Others found the difficulty associated with crossing discouraged them from entering the city at all. Salma, a resident of the suburb of Abu Dis, who had at one point crossed the Barrier without a permit while in labour in order to give birth in Jerusalem, now said she found it 'easier to pretend Jerusalem doesn't exist.' She had not visited in several years, even though she had the opportunity to obtain a permit to enter the city during Ramadan, because she found her disconnection from Jerusalem so painful. Amneh from Kufr Aqab, who had various health problems, had not gone to see her doctor on the Jerusalem side of the Barrier for several weeks because she anticipated the journey across the checkpoint would be too strenuous.
Embodied practices
Mobility related to leisure, rather than to quotidian journeys, can also serve to undermine boundaries and Israeli control in Jerusalem's urban space. Activities such as walking, running, cycling or parkour resonate with notions of freedom of movement on both an affective and a political level. Dina, who goes on regular extended runs in areas surrounding Jerusalem, found this allowed her to experience the 'Palestinian landscape' in new ways. While running gave her the sense of being 'like a bird set free', she also made the conscious decision to run on roads usually reserved for settlers, and thus to overstep the enclave borders prescribed by the occupation.
Similarly linking embodied experience with collective political visions of space, walks through the Palestinian landscape have been discussed as a means of personally connecting to the land and its history, but also of resisting the increasing fragmentation of Palestinian space (Shehadeh, 2008) .
However, those engaging in outdoor sports such as mountain biking near settlements noted their circumspection because encounters in seam zones could be dangerous (Bilal). Others found that engaging in such activities caused potentially dangerous confusion about their identity; one East
Jerusalem commuter who cycled to work, for instance, was regularly mistaken for an Israeli or foreigner because this was seen as unusual behaviour for a Palestinian. Palestinian youth who practice parkour or BMX stunts in Jerusalem's old city test the boundaries of accepted behaviour by using space in unexpected manners. Their disruption of the routines of shared and highly securitised spaces, such as the stairs leading to Damascus Gate, makes light of a tense situation. Acting in a spatially expansive manner by acting rowdy or blocking the way of passers-by, they subtly provoke soldiers on patrol ( Figure 2 ) and thereby exert a certain light-hearted dominance over the space. 
Transgressions into settlement enclaves
The inequitable distribution of resources, which becomes especially apparent at the seam zones 
Upholding and reinforcing enclave borders

Marginalised exclaves as zones of autonomy
While Palestinians regularly enter secular Israeli areas for business or pleasure, Palestinian neighbourhoods are rarely visited by Jewish Israelis, in particular since the second Intifada (Garb and Savitch, 2005; Greenberg-Ranaan and Shuval, 2013) . Palestinians capitalise on the lack of Israeli movement into their neighbourhoods -in particular in the exclaves outside the Barrier. The socio-spatial exclusion of these areas has numerous drawbacks, yet residents also utilise the fact that housing beyond the Wall is more affordable and not subject to the same level of stringent regulation that makes legal construction close to impossible in East Jerusalem. Because of this, the exclaves have seen a veritable building boom in recent years, and thousands of new residents have moved in (Kufr Aqab village council; see also Dajani et al., 2013; Charney and Rosen, 2014 ).
According to a member of the local committee of Shuafat refugee camp, many residents here refuse to pay the municipality or companies associated with it: 'In Shuafat, everything is free. People do not pay for a building permit, we refuse to pay municipal taxes or bills for water or electricity.'
When residents of the camp refused to grant access to tax inspectors, this caused politicians to worry that Israeli sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem was being called into question (Selig, 2010; Pitrikovsky, 2014 (Yiftachel, 2009) created by the exclusionary exclaves to their advantage in order to circumvent the mobility regime imposed by the Israeli occupation (legal counsel for Kufr Aqab residents). As they move to the margins of the city in order to be able to remain part of it, their socio-spatial exclusion, paradoxically, grants them a certain degree of autonomy and freedom from Israeli from interference of the Israeli mobility regime. Palestinian perspective, this accommodation was due to a sense of resignation: 'The people were already paying for the train and couldn't stop its construction, so they made use of it' (Ahmad). Yet, Palestinian attitudes to the train remained ambivalent, with some residents supporting a full boycott and others expressing concern with regard to personal safety (Noor, Shuafat), or unwillingness to pay for tickets: 'I see the train as a settler project, so of course I don't want to support it financially' (Rania, Ramallah resident working in Jerusalem). Indeed, the number of riders who do not pay for their ticket is higher at the stops in Palestinian areas, according to JTMT statistics, suggesting that skipping the fare may be used as a form of silent protest against the Israeli municipality, a type of 'everyday resistance' (Scott, 1985) . [having to transfer to a bus] means even a small inconvenience to the settlers, if they will avoid Shuafat in the future, then the protests have achieved something.' Even after the light rail began operating again, attacks with rocks and paint continued, damaging a large portion of the rolling stock (JTMT Engineer). More than mindless destruction, then, we might then think of the disruption of the light rail as a form of 'tactical vandalism' (Ward, 1973) , an attempt to maintain the existing enclave borders by limiting Israeli transgressions. This shows that marginalised urban residents are not only victims of exclusion from 'spaces of flow' (Castells, 1996) , but that they also have the capacity to disrupt the routines of those living in premium networked spaces, and thereby 'decompress' their time-space (Sopranzetti, 2014) . The image of the train initially promoted, as a symbol of the city growing together as a 'cosmopolitan metropolis' (Nolte and Yacobi, 2015) , was destroyed by the attacks, and suddenly the light rail became an emblem of Jerusalem's ongoing conflict (cf. Miller, 2014) . Expressing the origins of Palestinian ambivalence to the light rail, Ahmad, who had lived in Shuafat for much of his life, stated: 'People tried to convince themselves that this train is a civilised thing. But this happy picture is just based on racism, it's fake. We don't want this kind of civilisation.' After close to five decades of Israeli occupation and neglect, Palestinians are 'tired', as Hamdi put it, and want to live decent lives, therefore taking 'what [they] can get' in terms of services from the municipality. At the same time, the light rail is seen as a symbol of normalisation that glosses over the underlying situation of unequal citizenship and urban rights. Therefore, it was rejected in a highly symbolic manner, even if this meant that residents deprived themselves of one of the few services the municipality provides for them.
Access restrictions and the self-limitation of movement
While the state has access to formal means of enforcing borders, the JLR incident shows that the interruption of mobility from the bottom up can also serve to reinforce enclaves. In times of heightened violence or political tension, Israeli security services increase access control across Jerusalem by operating temporary checkpoints at the entrance to Jewish settlements or by cordoning off access roads to Palestinian areas with concrete blocks to restrict the movement of entire communities (Eisenbud, 2014; Hasson, 2015) . In the sense of Foucault, such closures (familiar from the West Bank) are a way of 'partitioning' space in order to gain greater control and 'break up collective dispositions ' (1979: 143) . Yet, the regulation of access to enclaves is not only a top-down strategy, and boundaries are also reinforced by people's self-limitation in terms of movement. In times of heightened inter-ethnic violence in Jerusalem, young men in Palestinian neighbourhoods easily accessible to Israelis such as Wadi al-Joz erected vigilante checkpoints. Some perceived areas behind the Barrier to be safer than areas of East Jerusalem more accessible to Israelis. Sameer, a father of two school-age children, explained: 'In Beit Hanina we can't let our children go outside to play -so we sent them to their grandmother in Kufr Aqab, there they can play outside, no settlers will enter there.' In this way, the abjection of the marginalised exclaves outside the Wall, also creates a protective buffer from outside intrusions.
As the threat of violence in shared areas increases, residents restrict their movements to the most necessary and retreat into 'purified' spaces; they avoid military installations such as checkpoints Geographies of fear in urban settings, often discussed in relation to crime and terrorism, are closely linked to fear of Otherness (cf. Bannister and Fife, 2001) . The personal fears respondents in access to Israeli spaces. Such an instance of 'colonial ambivalence' (Bhabha, 1994) , then, perhaps illustrates the limitations of enclave urbanism in a dense urban setting: while borders may be clearly delineated, movement within and exchange across them are never fully suppressed. At the street level, people interact -whether in a civil or hostile manner.
Reconsidering enclave urbanism in light of everyday mobility
Enclavisation and the restriction of Palestinian movement is a key spatial strategy of the Israeli occupation across the territories occupied in 1967 (Falah, 2005) . These mechanisms of control are reflected at a more local scale in Jerusalem -yet they function differently in dense urban fabric, where daily movements cannot be controlled and curtailed in the same manner. As I have shown, not only states or economic elites have the capacity to mobilise and immobilise -subaltern mobilities and disruptions of movement can also undermine or reinforce urban enclaves.
Examining everyday movements across enclaves has allowed contradictions and ambiguities to emerge that would have been lost when focusing solely on residential patterns. This approach has
shown that Palestinians living in marginalised areas of East Jerusalem routinely transgress both explicit boundaries and less visible residential borders to make use of amenities in Jewish enclaves (albeit often with ambivalent attitudes), forging 'activity spaces' (Kwan, 2009) under Apartheid rule, where racial mixing was quietly tolerated (Elder, 1990) . In both, deregulation created a situation of insecurity, but also allowed autonomy and breathing space away from state control.
In disrupting the Jerusalem Light Rail, residents of Shuafat appeared to counter-intuitively entrench their own marginalisation by depriving themselves of access to a public service -yet I have argued that this immobilisation of the train constituted a defence of Palestinian enclave borders. As in other (post)colonial cities which have always had splintered service provision (Kooy and Bakker, 2008; Zérah, 2008) , the 'modern infrastructural ideal' mourned by much of the literature on enclave urbanism was never present in Jerusalem. The highly symbolic acts of destruction by which Palestinians expressed their rejection of the light rail dismantle the notion that marginalised groups necessarily seek, or benefit from, inclusion in premium services. In disrupting Israeli mobility, Palestinians adopted tactics familiar from the Israeli mobility regime. If continuous circulation (based on the metaphor of the healthy human body) epitomises the functioning city (Swyngedouw, 2006) , and since the light rail served as 'the symbol of connecting different parts of Jerusalem'
(Tamir Nir, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem in charge of Transportation), we might read this interruption of flows through attacks on infrastructure as a refusal to be part of the Israeli municipality and the body politic it represents.
As I have argued that the light rail can be understood as a frontier expanding exclusive enclaves at the expense of marginalised residents, we should consider that 'infrastructural violence' is not only at work when excluded groups lack access to public services. In a situation of territorial conflict like the one in Jerusalem, incorporation into infrastructural circuits can also constitute a form of violence. In more 'ordinary' cities too, then, urban infrastructures should not only be seen as the markers or borders of exclusion in enclave urbanism, but potentially as a potential means of expanding premium enclaves. While Palestinians view the JLR as a vehicle of colonial expansion, elsewhere, improved access to mobility infrastructures can act as a harbinger of gentrification (Lin, 2002; Kaufmann et al., 2007; Grube-Cavers and Patterson, 2013) . It may therefore be worth examining the role of everyday mobility in processes of displacement involved in gentrification or the 'upgrading' of informal settlements.
Because traversing the city is necessarily an embodied experience, I have attempted to highlight the importance of affect in the perception of intra-urban borders, in their transgression and in encounters with the other. In the 'alarmist' narrative of enclave urbanism such encounters are generally marked by conflict and fear, whereas I have shown a fluctuation between civil quotidian interactions (which can alter conceptions of enclaves previously considered hostile) and encounters marked by fear in periods of heightened inter-ethnic violence. The notion that more contact in shared spaces would necessarily foster urban cohesion, implied by much of the literature on urban enclaves, was not confirmed by the light rail in Jerusalem or the new spaces of interaction it opened up. While an uneasy civility prevailed on the train during its initial years of operation, quotidian contact between different groups on the newly shared mode of transport appears to have done little to overcome underlying differences (cf. Amin, 2002; Valentine, 2008) . Like other new spaces of normalisation, such as the Israeli malls increasingly frequented by Palestinians, the light rail might initially have given the appearance of an 'already binational city' (Shtern, 2015) . However, because this limited interaction took place in the context of ongoing occupation, ethnocratic rule and urban inequality, the light rail did not become a site of positive encounter. Rather, it expanded the potential zone of friction, as evidenced by increasingly violent incidents along the route of the light rail, including stabbings and vehicular attacks (Heller, 2014) . In that it limits expansive movement beyond one's own enclave, we might think of such ethnically-based violence in shared spaces or towards outsiders as a (particularly insidious) type of 'border enforcement'. Ultimately, this kind of re-enforcement of enclave borders in times of tension serves to maintain homogeneity within enclaves and minimise spaces of ambiguity, usually located in liminal areas -a 'purification of space' which, as we see here, is not only carried out by the dominant group. Critiques of enclave urbanism have focused on the segregation of mobility infrastructures as it allows (kinetic) elites to avoid encountering marginalised Others. Yet a bottom-up reading of quotidian mobilities in Jerusalem suggests that structural inequalities cannot be overcome merely by everyday interaction.
While urban enclaves exacerbate social distance in spite of physical proximity, temporarily jointly inhabited spaces, such as the light rail, alone are unlikely forge solidarity across these divides.
This examination of Jerusalem's enclaves through the lens of Palestinian everyday mobility has, then, altered the narrative of the top-down approach focused on residential segregation. It has shown both how tactical mobility can undermine residential segregation by eroding homogeneity and how marginalised residents can stop incursions, thus reinforcing urban divisions in order to preserve their own ethno-national space. If we understand space as relational rather than static and accept that intra-urban boundaries, like all space, are socially produced and underpinned by people's actions, we cannot ignore the role of mobility, or lack thereof, when attempting to make sense of the enclave city.
